Macbeth’s murder of Duncan is a sensible crime, not because it’s practical or judicious (it’s neither), but because it’s born of the senses and experienced as sensation. This is not to say that Macbeth does not think himself into the criminal event, but that the thinking he does he does with his body. *Macbeth* presents criminal thoughts not as ontologically distinct products of the intellect or soul, but as secretions of the senses, properties of active receptive bodies moving through a world of things. Focusing on the dagger scene in act 2, scene 1, this essay shows how criminality becomes a field for phenomenological speculation in the play. Macbeth’s experience of criminal becoming is characterized by what Bruce Smith calls “a relational way of knowing,” one in which murderous thoughts are shaped by physical, sensual interaction with the objects of the material world.1 For Macbeth, then, being criminal might more accurately be described as feeling criminal. Criminality is less a state of being than “a unit of experience,” a process involving both ideas and things in a way that forces us to abandon the mutually exclusive categories of subject and object.

Criminality was a career-long preoccupation for Shakespeare, and his approach to the topic varied from play to play, from poem to poem, and even within individual plays or poems. Still, one can identify a marked tendency in his writing to seek criminality beyond the flesh. In *The Rape of Lucrece*, it is “some untimely thought did instigate” Tarquin’s “all too timeless speed” (ll.43–44) towards the woman he would violate. Richard Duke of Gloucester is from the very outset of *Richard III* defined as someone whose criminality originates within, at the level of thoughts, someone who is malicious to the core and who understands, moreover, the inner reaches of the self to be not only a source of crime, but also a place of concealment: “Dive, thoughts, down to my soul” (1.1.41), he says as Clarence approaches. Angelo, in *Measure for Measure*, begins the play with a
strikingly positivist approach to crime: “What’s open made to justice, / That justice seizes” (2.1.21–22, emphasis added), he admonishes Escalus. But it is not long before Isabella directs him to his “bosom,” his “heart,” for signs of his own “natural guiltiness” (2.2.137, 138, 139), and it is, indeed, from within that his first pangs of illicit lust for Isabella eventually emerge. Othello quite literally seeks criminality beyond the flesh, seizing Desdemona and gazing into her eyes—the window to her soul—in a bid to glimpse the canker of disobedience that he feels convinced must be lodged within her (4.2.25–30). Macbeth may initially strike us as consistent with these earlier plays and poems. To be sure, Macbeth teaches us not only that power corrupts, but also that knowledge corrupts: bad thoughts lead to bad deeds. The murder of Duncan finds its source in Macbeth’s acquisition of eerily untimely knowledge from the witches: “All hail, Macbeth, that shalt be King hereafter” (1.3.50). And when he hisses despairingly to Lady Macbeth, “O, full of scorpions is my mind, dear wife” (3.2.36), he is referring not only to the guilt and paranoia that has seized hold of him since the murder, but also to those corrupting seeds of knowledge from which his malice (first towards Duncan and now towards Banquo and Fleance) originally sprung.

More pervasive in Macbeth, though, is an account of criminality that cannot be described adequately through rigid dichotomies of mind and body or mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus (guilty act). Similar to the way theorists of the passions in Renaissance Europe relied on a psychophysiology that blurred the boundaries between inner and outer, Shakespeare imagines crime in Macbeth not in sequential terms (first I think, then I do), but in terms of a fluid, phenomenological exchange between mind and matter to the extent that criminal thoughts and criminal acts are often difficult to distinguish. Early on in the play, Macbeth speaks of his “thought, whose murther yet is but fantastical” (1.3.139). The sense of this line is not, as one editor of the play has proposed, the murder of a thought, but instead a thought that will itself murder, a thought that is equivalent to the physical act of murder and that cannot, therefore, be fully contained within the category of mens rea. Instead, “thought” here marks a collapse of the juridical concepts of mens rea and actus reus into each other. Macbeth’s description later in the play of his illicit machinations as being “young in deed” (3.4.143) is telling in a similar way. To describe the thinking stage of a plot as “young in deed” is to cast thought itself as merely one point in the evolution of a deed rather than as something autonomously metaphysical. Deeds, to broach the issue from the other direction, are things that have thoughts folded into them as a constituent substance. While Macbeth is in many ways a play about the mind
and the “scorpions” that may come to inhabit it, its treatment of criminality does not rely on a notion of the mental as a distinct ambit of experience, as René Descartes would begin to argue so influentially some thirty years later.6 This is, perhaps, only fitting in a play so committed to the breakdown of dualities; a play in which days are “foul and fair” (1.3.38); things are “welcome and unwelcome” (4.3.138), neither ill nor good (1.3.131); a play in which “to do harm / Is often laudable, to do good sometime / Accounted dangerous folly” (4.2.75–77).7

The dagger soliloquy in act 2, scene 1 presents Macbeth’s most sustained and sophisticated articulation of nondualistic criminality. To view it, as a number of critics have, as a moment of projected imagination or conscience oversimplifies the speech’s complex marshaling of mind and matter. Rather than simply disclosing some form of interiority—“the growth of evil in the mind,”8 “the divided soul,”9 “the functioning of conscience”10—Shakespeare stages the process of becoming criminal as one in which physical sensation is integral to mental conception.11 The initial question that Macbeth poses—“Is this a dagger which I see before me, / The handle toward my hand?” (2.1.33–34)—has to do not only with what at that moment Macbeth knows, but also, as we quickly discover, with how he knows it: through vision (“see”) and through touch (“Come, let me clutch thee” [2.1.34]).12 These lines describe knowledge and thought as part of a larger sensual experience that extends beyond the mental or spiritual into a real, material world of things and actions. Criminality, in other words, is performed as a phenomenological process and is not, therefore, anchored to any founding moment of cogito.

In the simplest sense, criminality in Macbeth is phenomenological because it deals with the intentional dimension of infraction. The doctrine of intentionality—the cornerstone of Husserlian phenomenology—states that every act of consciousness, every thought, is directed towards an object of some sort. That is to say, consciousness is always consciousness of something or other: the thought and the thing are never readily separable.13 Indeed, the thing—what Husserl would call an “intentional object,” or noema14—creates the thought, creates the very conditions of sentience, not the other way around. In Macbeth’s soliloquy, the dagger takes on the role of the intentional object. It catalyzes Macbeth’s consciousness of his own criminality and at the same time teeters playfully on the frontier between idea and object.15 The dagger’s intentional quality marks it as substantial rather than phantasmic and, at the same time, differentiates it from the instrumental agency that Luke Wilson discovers in early modern tools, the legal institution of the deodand, and literary representations of objects.16 In the case of the dagger, agency is not embedded in the instrument itself, as it
is in Wilson’s weed-hooks, brushing bills, and pitchforks. Instead, agency emerges—like consciousness and cognition more generally—from a sensory encounter with the instrument and should be thought of, therefore, as something distributed among person and object. In Martin Heidegger’s version of phenomenology, this intentional approach to thought meant that all being, all consciousness, must be understood as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein), in a world “out there” rather than “in here.” Similarly, Hannah Arendt in The Life of the Mind (1977) sought to affirm the active, quasi-physiological qualities of thought by insisting that the mind is always “the mind of the maker of use-objects,” “a toolmaker’s mind,” “the mind of a body endowed with hands.” Merleau-Ponty took the notion of In-der-Welt-sein one step further, declaring that “there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself.”

Merleau-Ponty’s focus, especially in The Phenomenology of Perception (1945), is on perception—the way our senses gather information from a reality that is “always ‘already there’ before reflection begins” as the intentional act par excellence. Rather than seeing the world and our actions in it as the products of ideas innate within the mind, Merleau-Ponty subscribed to George Berkeley’s empiricist credo that we can only conceive what we first perceive, and thus that thought is largely the product of embodied experience of the world. “All knowledge,” Merleau-Ponty insists, “takes place within the horizons opened up by perception.”

This pronouncement is seminal within the history of twentieth-century phenomenology and phenomenology’s critique of transcendental philosophy, but it also gestures backwards to similarly sensual theories of human cognition resident within Aristotelian philosophy, including scholasticism and neo-scholasticism. Aristotle understood the soul, or the mind, to be the domain not only of intellectual powers, but also of vegetative and sensitive powers, including all forms of internal and external sensation, appetite, and motion. Thomas Aquinas, following his lead, argued that all knowledge and thought start with the reception in the external sense organs of what he terms “sensible species” transmitted from the sensible qualities in external objects. This Thomastic model of cognition—precisely the model that Descartes’s dualistic, Platonic physiology would seek to do away with—was maintained by later scholastics in the Renaissance period and even by Pierre Gassendi in the seventeenth century, who was otherwise a harsh critic of Aristotle. There is, then, something curiously premodern about Merleau-Ponty’s sensual account of thought and, indeed, about the conceptual machinery of phenomenology, more generally. Phenomenology, we might say, constitutes an iterative universal, an embodied and object-oriented way of thinking about thinking that recurs in different
contexts at a variety of historical moments over a wide expanse of time. Shakespeare’s theater forms one of these zones of iteration, making it part of a long intellectual history of phenomenological insight that it participates in not with the systematic rigor of philosophy, but through the more allusive, intuitive forms of speculation germane to art.

In presenting criminality as a dynamic relationship between ideas, objects, and bodies, the dagger scene offers a particularly compelling example of phenomenological thinking instantiated in theatrical terms:

Come, let me clutch thee:
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To feeling as to sight? Or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
I see thee yet, in form as palpable
As this which now I draw.

(2.1.34–41)

Knowledge—specifically, in this case, criminal self-knowledge—requires a physical extension outwards towards something in the material world. The kernel of thought is not mental activity per se, but the objects which generate that mental activity when perceived by the senses. Thinking exceeds the boundaries of the purely physical or purely mental since it entails an act of quasi-physical mental acquisition, one that in this soliloquy is literalized when Macbeth reaches out for the mental dagger, eventually replacing it with his own real dagger. This series of gestures is a performance of Husserlian intentionality, and it returns us to the sense embedded in that term’s Latin root, intendere, meaning literally to stretch out, to reach towards.28

Macbeth’s unsheathing of his weapon—the real dagger—coincides with the soliloquy’s most hallucinogenic rendering of the visionary dagger. “There’s no such thing” (2.1.47), Macbeth avers, dubbing his eyes “the fools o’th’other senses” (2.1.44). Yet, even at this moment of extreme doubt, a moment which John Russell Brown remarks, “almost acknowledges . . . the mental origin of the dagger,”29 Macbeth’s experience remains in thrall to the shaping energies of physical sensation. I quote the passage in full:

Mine eyes are made the fools o’th’other senses,
Or else worth all the rest. I see thee still;
And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood,
Which was not so before. There’s no such thing:
It is the bloody business which informs
Thus to mine eyes.

(2.1.44–49)

Macbeth frets over whether vision is misguiding his other senses or is the only sense to be trusted. In either case, the dagger, to the extent that it exists at all, exists as and through sensation. One would be hard pressed to find anything in this passage that describes the dagger as a product of the mind. If it is a product of anything, it is a product of the eyes, physical sense organs. “I see thee still,” Macbeth boggles. And when he decides finally that there is “no such thing,” it is not an elision of the dagger’s physical reality in favor of some mentally derived and substanceless existence at the level of pure concept. In fact, the opposite seems closer to the truth. Macbeth’s resolution that there is “no such thing” is bolstered by the assertion that “It is the bloody business [i.e., the murder of Duncan] which informs / Thus to mine eyes.” Macbeth’s visual, sensory experience of the dagger derives from an objectified future event, not from an originary immaterial idea. When Macbeth denies the existence of the dagger, he denies it precisely as a projection of his mind. Perception, on the other hand, he takes seriously throughout, even as the tempest of disbelief jostles him to and fro. This sort of amalgam of existential doubt and physical certitude is addressed by Merleau-Ponty, who explains that “the perceived, by its very nature, admits of the ambiguous, the shifting, and is shaped by its context.”

Macbeth’s disbelief and confusion, in other words, is not antithetical to perception, but rather a property of it.

The interaction with the dagger in act 2, scene 1, provides the coordinates for a legal phenomenology that we can trace deeper into the play. This legal phenomenology concedes that crime involves knowledge, but it insists that knowledge is always situated in a lived environment. It concedes that crime involves thinking, but it insists that one always thinks with things—with daggers, with pillows, with bodies. Consider Macbeth’s resolution in act 4 when he decides to ambush Macduff’s castle and murder his wife and children:

From this moment
The very firstlings of my heart shall be
There is something ironically belated about this statement. Here, in act 4, Macbeth epiphanically commits himself to a form of active thinking that has characterized his criminal conduct at least since act 2. It remains an arresting passage, though, both in terms of the self-consciousness with which Macbeth adopts a legal phenomenological disposition and in terms of the pointedness with which it denies thought-act chronology. This, Macbeth’s third murderous undertaking (after Duncan and Banquo), is not thought then done; it is “thought and done.” Thinking and doing are both, simultaneously, “firstlings”; one is of the heart, one is of the hand, but both are folded together into a single criminal event. For Lady Macbeth, too, heart and hand, mind and body, converge to form a phenomenological cusp along which criminality structures itself. For her, murderous intentions, “mortal thoughts” (1.5.41), can only be conceived of in embodied terms:

As Lady Macbeth directs herself with increasing determination towards the murder of Duncan, we do not witness criminal malice evolving in any conventional sense from her mind. Lady Macbeth’s “mortal thoughts” are thoughts, indeed, but, far from being abstractions, they are presented as concrete things that “fill” the body “from the crown to the toe topful.” Moreover, the movement from “mortal thoughts” to mortal act is not expressed in dichotomous or even sequential terms, with ideas passing across a threshold into the territory of bodily action. Instead, this movement between “fell purpose” and “Th’effect” is described as an integrated
physiological process involving the thickening of the blood and the closure of various bodily valves and passageways. Thinking, to be sure, remains an integral part of criminality in this passage. But thinking is also retheorized as a species of feeling, as something that takes place in and through a body. In this respect, Lady Macbeth’s dark ruminations lay the conceptual groundwork for the legal phenomenology that receives its fullest and most sensational (in all senses of that term) treatment in the soliloquy of act 2, scene 1.

Like all of Shakespeare’s plays, Macbeth is a product of its time and has important things to tell us about the religious, legal, political, and social topography of Renaissance England. But the portrayal of murder in the play shows us that Macbeth also belongs to a history of ideas that extends far beyond the boundaries of early modernity. Through its treatment of crime, Macbeth manifests in specifically theatrical terms a nondualistic way of thinking articulated variously by Aristotle, Aquinas, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Arendt, each of whom in their own way have sought to reclaim action, vision, sensation, and collective physical experience back into the domain of the mental. Shakespeare’s phenomenology of crime leads us beyond the egocentric predicament of Platonic and Cartesian philosophy to an intentional form of consciousness where one thinks with things and makes plans for the past. It invites us, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, to “rediscover” a place “anterior to the ideas of subject and object,” a “primordial layer at which both things and ideas come into being.” For scholars interested in literature and law, this approach to Macbeth offers new ways of thinking about law’s knowledge-making properties, since it puts the artistic rendering of criminality into conversation with systematic attempts to model human experience and consciousness in philosophy. For Shakespeareans, it offers an opportunity to reevaluate what legal themes could be made to do in Shakespeare’s plays. The dagger soliloquy shows the juridical serving as an occasion for, not just a subject of, contemplation and inquiry: the exploration of murder in the scene opens out to a larger exploration of perception. To interrogate the line between innocence and guilt, Shakespeare seems to tells us, is also to interrogate the line between mind and matter, subject and object, conceiving and doing, being and feeling. In positing a certain way of thinking about infraction, Macbeth also offers us a compelling way of thinking about thinking.

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NOTES


11. I tip my hat here to other nondualistic readings of *Macbeth*, even if they pursue questions very different from the ones that motivate this essay. See, for example, Marjorie Garber, who focuses on the theme of consciousness as one “which unites the inner world of private vision and the outer world of visible reality” (*Dream in Shakespeare: From Metaphor to Metamorphosis* [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974], 91), and Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson, both of whom discover a startlingly porous boundary between mind and body in *Macbeth* when read from the perspective of Renaissance humoral theory (Katherine Rowe, “Minds in Company: Shakespeare’s Tragic Emotions,” in *A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works: Volume 1: The Tragedies*, ed. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard [Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003], 47–72; and Mary Floyd-Wilson, “English Epicures and Scottish Witches,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 57, no. 2 [2006]: 131–61). The tradition of dualistic criticism, on the other hand (of which Camille Wells Slights, John S. Wilks, Abraham Stoll, and Ned Lukacher are a part), reads Shakespeare from the perspective of modern, Cartesian subjectivity, which yokes all agency to the internalized conflicts of the individual’s thoughts and desires. This kind of approach finds its origin, first, in Hegel, and then in A. C. Bradley, especially their respective readings of *Hamlet* (see G. W. F. Hegel, “Dramatic Poetry,” in *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art: Volume 2*, trans. T. M. Knox [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 1158–238; and A. C.


17. Critical work on the phenomenology of agency has been reviewed most recently by Tim Bayne, who coins the term “agentive experience” (see “The Phenomenology of Agency,” *Philosophy Compass* 3, no. 1 [2008]: 182–202).


21. Ibid., vii.


27. Merleau-Ponty describes the goal of phenomenology as one of “re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world” (Phenomenology, vii, emphasis added).


32. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 255.
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